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THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
Marshall Leaffer* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
What do Martha Stewart, the impresario of good living, Tiger 
Woods, a dominate sports figure of our time, and Paul Newman, the 
film actor and owner of a line of food products, have in common?  
The answer is that these celebrities enjoy powerful rights in their 
public persona.  The identity rights of celebrities include their 
names, faces, voices, and practically any other distinguishing 
characteristic.  This phenomenon is not new.  In U.S. law, 
celebrities have enjoyed strong property rights in their persona 
under a number of legal bases such as federal trademark law, 
federal unfair competition law, dilution law, state trademark and 
unfair competition, not to mention perhaps the most powerful basis 
of all—state right of publicity law.  This multifaceted protection has 
created a synergetic effect, resulting in an uninhibited and 
seemingly unlimited property right of celebrities in their persona.  
On the whole, the law in the United States has been particularly 
solicitous in the protection of celebrities. 
Who should reap the benefits of celebrity images and how rights 
should be allocated in their use is more than of passing curiosity.  
Certain recent tendencies in the law, both in the United States and 
abroad, that create ever more expansive protections for identity 
interests are a troubling development for many.1  Celebrity images, 
such as those mentioned above, have entered into the common 
lexicon, permeating the public discourse imbued with an enduring 
and ever evolving symbolic meaning.  Celebrities as public figures 
are an integral part of democratic dialog and the iconic significance 
 
* Professor and Distinguished Scholar in Intellectual Property Law, Indiana University, 
School of Law. 
1 See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, We are Symbols and Inhabit Symbols, So Should We 
Be Paying Rent? Deconstructing the Lanham Act and Rights of Publicity, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. 
& ARTS 123, 156 (1996). 
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of Elvis Presley, Marilyn Monroe, and Brigitte Bardot transcend 
their fame as entertainers.  As professor Dreyfuss has stated: “They 
are amusing.  They set moods and communicate status.  They 
represent how their utilizers see themselves (or wish to have 
themselves seen) politically and culturally.”2  Thus, I believe, as do 
many others, that the law must balance the celebrity’s interest in 
controlling their image with the public’s interest in using those 
images as a means of communication. 
Unlike the United States, which has embraced a very far reaching 
right protecting personas, other countries in the common law world 
are only beginning to entertain such protection.  For example, 
plaintiffs in the U.K. have, until recently, been unsuccessful in 
attempting to persuade the courts that unauthorized commercial 
exploitation of personality can come within the tort of passing off; 
that is, liability based on a misrepresentation leading to public 
confusion that damages plaintiff’s business goodwill.3  The British 
situation is of particular interest because it represents one instance 
of a developed country resisting the inexorable creation of new and 
expansive intellectual property rights, at least in this one domain. 
Is the lack of specific protection for celebrity personas an 
anachronism in today’s world given the enormous economic stakes 
in merchandising famous identities?  Celebrity markets transcend 
national boundaries, and it is perhaps no coincidence that both 
common law and civil law countries are reassessing the issue, 
resulting in initial steps toward some kind of international norm on 
the issue of “publicity rights.” 4  But what should that norm be?  Is a 
legal doctrine that accepts human identity as a commodity 
warranted or desirable? 
Countries, such as the U.K., whose laws are in flux, naturally look 
to the United States’s laws whose experience with full-fledged 
publicity protection began over fifty years ago.5  In the United 
States, the right of publicity is now found in most states either by 
statute or by common law interpretation, and it is based on a 
 
2 See id. at 124. 
3 Catherine Seville, Peter Pan’s Rights:  “To Die Will Be an Awfully Big Adventure,” 51 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1, 12–13, 29 (2003). 
4 Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order:  Why National Courts Should Create 
Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469, 494–95 (2000). 
5 Two articles establishing the extent of the right are Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of 
Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 204–10 (1954) (arguing for a separate right 
divorced from privacy law) and William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 406 (1960) 
(basing the protection of purely commercial interests on “not so much a mental [interest] as a 
proprietary one”). 
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copyright like-moral rights model.6  U.S. publicity law, with its ever 
expanding contours and, in my opinion, lack of sound theoretical 
justification, has been the object of much controversy and scholarly 
criticism.7  The purpose of my article is to revisit the justifications 
for the right of publicity and to do so in comparative context with a 
particular emphasis on developments in the United Kingdom.  If 
British lawmakers asked my advice (which they certainly will not), I 
would tell them that protection of celebrity personas is well 
administered by current law—particularly that of unfair 
competition.  Sometimes doing nothing is the best approach to law-
making in the domain of intellectual property. 
The following discussion traces the development of this ever 
expanding right and the incoherency that comes from applying 
quasi-copyright law protection to the personas of celebrities.  In 
short, my position is this: U.S. law concerning the right of publicity 
is based on dubious and incoherent principles and has led to thorny 
practical problems of application.  As suggested above, it is overly 
broad, and vaguely contoured.  My overall conclusion is that 
identity interests are better tailored to an action for false 
endorsement based on trademark concepts of consumer confusion.  
Actions for false endorsement, based on section 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act,8 have been a part of U.S. law for some time now and similar 
doctrines are beginning to develop in the U.K. as well.9  Before I 
turn to the British situation, I will review the growth of the right of 
publicity (albeit with a jaundiced eye) as it stands in the United 
States. 
II.  UNITED STATES AND THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
A.  The New Right 
The “right of publicity” was first adopted in 1953, by Judge Frank, 
in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.10 with 
 
6 The leading treatise on the subject is 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY 
AND PRIVACY § 2:1–:2, 6:3, 6:8 (2d ed. West Group 2003) (1937) [hereinafter MCCARTHY]. 
7 See, e.g., Prosser, supra note 5, at 389 (noting that “[t]he law of privacy comprises four 
distinct kinds of invasion of four different interests of the plaintiff” and because of the 
different rules which correspond to each interest, confusion may follow) 
8 Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C § 1125(a) (2000). 
9 Carrie Rainen, The Right of Publicity in the United States and the United Kingdom, 12 
NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 197, 214–22 (2005). 
10 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953) (concerning the use of baseball player images on cards). 
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brief explanation of it as an economic, not a personal right: 
We think that, in addition to and independent of that right of 
privacy . . . a man has a right in the publicity value of his 
photograph . . . [and] to grant the exclusive privilege of 
publishing his picture, and that such a grant may validly be 
made ‘in gross’ . . . . 
This right might be called a ‘right of publicity.’11 
In Haelen, the right of publicity issue arose almost by accident 
because the case was brought as an intentional interference with 
contractual relations case.12  The decision does not specify the 
theoretical basis for the new publicity right or why a right of 
publicity was necessary at all.13  Judge Frank could have opted for a 
broadening of federal unfair competition law, an approach that 
could have achieved the same result.  Instead, he fashioned what is 
easily characterized as a de facto property right in personality, and 
one that was not constrained by the limits of privacy rights claims.  
From the opinion, Judge Frank did not wish to establish a right 
having all the attributes of property but was only interested in 
establishing an assignable right.14  Despite Judge Frank’s 
functionalist approach to a practical problem, the right of publicity 
soon became a formalized property right, eventually acquiring all 
the attributes of property, including the transferability of the rights 
via legacy though will or intestacy.15 
Since Haelan, the right of publicity has taken hold in dramatic 
fashion, and is now recognized by statute or common law in a 
majority of states.16  In its various forms, the right of publicity has 
materialized into a virtually unlimited, descendible, and assignable 
property right.  The subject matter of the right and its 
transferability vary significantly among the states.17  From time to 
 
11 Id. at 868. 
12 Id. at 867. 
13 Id. at 868. 
14 Id. (“Whether it be labeled a ‘property’ right is immaterial; for here, as often elsewhere, 
the tag ‘property’ simply symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a claim which has pecuniary 
worth.”). 
15 See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Rereading Warren and Brandeis: Privacy, Property, and 
Appropriation, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 647, 667–68 (1991). 
16 Cf. Barabara A. Solomon, Can the Lanham Act Protect Tiger Woods? An Analysis of 
Whether the Lanham Act is a Proper Substitute for a Federal Right of Publicity, 94 
TRADEMARK REP. 1202, 1202 (2004) (“While the majority of U.S. states recognize a statutory 
or common law right of publicity to protect against the appropriation of one’s likeness for 
commercial purposes, the laws provide, at best, patchwork relief.”). 
17 Id. at 1202–03. 
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time, attention has turned to some form of harmonization of the 
right under a federal statute but nothing seems imminent at this 
moment.18 
B.  Ossification of Publicity Rights as Property 
Categorization of the right of publicity as a pure property right 
has won the day but has lead to unexpected, perhaps even perverse, 
consequences.  As David Westfall and David Landau have shown, 
the property analogy has been pushed to the limit, leading to thorny 
and even intractable problems of application in proceedings 
involving divorce and bankruptcy.19  Once publicity rights are 
characterized as property, the “property syllogism” inevitably kicks 
in and it is hard not to fall into its inexorable logic.  The deductive 
formula goes like this: if the right is transferable, it must be 
assignable.  And if assignable, it must be property, and since it is 
property it must have attribute X (which is shared by all property).  
Thus, it should be descendible like all property and must be subject 
to apportionment in divorce and disposition in bankruptcy 
proceedings. 
As mentioned above this ossification of publicity rights as 
property has stained traditional notions of property dispositions in 
settings such as bankruptcy and divorce proceedings.  As for 
bankruptcy, absent a state exemption statute, publicity rights could 
be sold to the highest bidder to pay creditors. But what would 
creditors acquire?  Could a trustee in bankruptcy force performance 
of services?  Professors Jacoby and Zimmerman noted how the right 
of publicity, involuntarily transferred in a bankruptcy proceeding, 
could result in forced labor by requiring the celebrity to perform in 
advertisements and other commercial ventures.20 
Divorce proceedings have also highlighted the problems that arise 
when publicity rights become an issue in marriage dissolution.21  
 
18 See ABA SECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW, COMM. ON FED. TRADEMARK 
LEGISLATION, ANNUAL REPORT, 2001–2002, PROPOSED FEDERAL RIGHT OF PUBLICITY ACT § 3, 
at 22–33, available at http://www.abanet.org/intelprop/annualreport06/content/01-02/ 
COMMITTEE%20NO%20201.pdf; Solomon, supra note 16, at 1203; Therese Evans, A Call for 
a Federal Uniform Law on the Right of Publicity 24–27 (2006) (unpublished comment, on file 
with Brooklyn Law School). 
19 David Westfall & David Landau, Publicity as Property Rights, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. 
L.J. 71, 99–117 (2005). 
20 See Melissa B. Jacoby & Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Foreclosing on Fame: Exploring 
the Uncharted Boundaries of the Right of Publicity, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1322, 1351 (2002). 
21 See id. at 1338–40; Westfall & Landau, supra note 19, at 99–112. 
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One issue that has plagued the courts is how to treat earning 
capacity developed during marriage in the context of marital 
property.22  Another related set of problems which has divided the 
courts is whether a claim to alimony limits the obligor’s freedom to 
choose a less remunerative occupation or retirement.23  In general, 
the issues that have arisen in the divorce and bankruptcy contexts 
are a function of reification of publicity rights as property.  The 
problems are also compounded by the increasing inclusiveness of 
indicia of identity that have become the subject matter of publicity 
rights. 
C.  The Expanding Right Includes Every Indicia of Identity 
Since its appearance in U.S. law in 1953, the subject matter 
contours of the right of publicity have expanded to encompass not 
only name and likeness, but also anything that vaguely relates to 
identity.  These include objects related to the celebrity’s fame such 
as a racecar driver’s car,24 a football player’s nickname,25  and a 
catch phrase identified with a talk show host.26  These examples are 
relatively banal compared to more creative extensions of identity 
which have encompassed a distinctive voice (Bette Midler),27 the 
likeness of a television personality (Vanna White),28 and a pitcher’s 
stance (Don Newcombe)29 to name a few instances.  The case law is 
replete with other examples and we are sure to see the collection 
grow, nurtured by the unimpeded imagination of the courts and the 
intellectual property bar.30  Why is there no break in the persistent 
march to incorporate more attributes of identity covered by the 
right of publicity?  Again one must look to the relentless logic of the 
property syllogism: once identity is formalized as property, it is 
difficult to limit its boundaries. 
 
22 Westfall & Landau, supra note 19, at 99–110. 
23 Id. at 110–12. 
24 Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1974). 
25 Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129, 130 (Wis. 1979) (“Crazylegs” Elroy 
Hirsch, football star). 
26 Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 836 (6th Cir. 1983) (“Here’s 
Johnny” Johnny Carson, television host). 
27 Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 461, 463–64 (9th Cir. 1988). 
28 White v. Samsung Elect. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1514 (9th Cir. 1993). 
29 Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 692–93 (9th Cir. 1998). 
30 For an exhaustive list of persons and things protected under the right of publicity, see 
MCCARTHY, supra note 6, §§ 4:45–:87. 
LEAFFER.JERRY.FINAL+AUTHOR.DOC 12/17/2007  11:14:44 AM 
2007] The Right of Publicity 1363 
D.  First Amendment Exemptions and Exceptions 
As the right of publicity has increased in scope, those who have 
been sued for uses of celebrity identity have turned to the First 
Amendment as the major limitation to the right.  Clearly, the right 
of publicity creates a tension with First Amendment values—
namely, the preservation an uninhibited marketplace of ideas and 
the furtherance of the individual right of self expression.  As one 
court phrased it, matters of public interest are “constitutionally 
protected and must supersede any private pecuniary 
considerations . . . even by those who urge more widespread 
recognition of a distinct property right of publicity.”31  But the 
courts, in trying to engraft exceptions to this expanding right, have 
created a disordered and incoherent body of First Amendment case 
law. 
Various and sundry First Amendment balancing tests can be 
found in the case law, the most controversial of which pertain to the 
artistic use of celebrity images.  Here, the problem is that the right 
of publicity has arisen in contexts that transcend the use of a 
celebrity image in contexts other than commercial advertising.  
Right of publicity cases that involve sculptures,32 paintings,33 
photographs,34 and t-shirt inscriptions35 are hard cases and their 
resolution is less than satisfactory.36  Most would acknowledge that 
the right of publicity needs to be reigned in when it burdens free 
expression, but no one convenient legal format has been found to set 
those limits.  The multiplicity and vagueness of these legal tests 
reveal their emptiness.  For example, one such test would ask 
whether the proprietary interests of the owner of the right of 
 
31 Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 299 N.Y.S.2d 501, 508–09 (Sup. Ct. Spec. Term 
1968). 
32 See Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 
S.E.2d 697, 703 (Ga. 1982) (“[T]he appropriation of another’s name and likeness, whether 
such likeness be a photograph or sculpture, without consent and for the financial gain of the 
appropriator is a tort . . . .”). 
33 Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 809 n.11 (Cal. 2001). 
34 Cf. Cabaniss v. Hipsley, 151 S.E.2d 496, 503 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966) (finding that falsely 
picturing the plaintiff entering an Atlanta club was insufficient to authorize a verdict for 
general damages). 
35 Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 799, 800–01, 811 (applying the right of publicity to t-shirt 
likenesses of the Three Stooges). 
36 See, e.g., Ayres v. City of Chicago, 125 F.3d 1010, 1017 (7th Cir. 1997) (granting a 
preliminary injunction preventing Chicago from enforcing a prohibition on street peddling 
because such a prohibition violated free speech). 
LEAFFER.JERRY.FINAL+AUTHOR.DOC 12/17/2007  11:14:44 AM 
1364 Albany Law Review [Vol. 70 
publicity outweigh the value of free expression.37  Another, borrowed 
from copyright law, is known as the transformative use test and 
would ask whether a product containing a celebrity’s likeness is so 
transformed that it has become primarily the defendant’s own 
expression rather than the celebrity’s likeness.38  The fact is that no 
judicial consensus has been reached on the contours of the First 
Amendment vis-à-vis the right of publicity. 
Reconciling the right of publicity with the First Amendment is a 
murky process, not to mention the lack of certainty for those 
asserting their First Amendment rights.  At the same time, it 
requires courts to make ill-considered aesthetic judgments about 
artistic value.  By contrast, trademark law reduces these speech 
concerns while protecting celebrity good will by limiting itself to the 
use of commercial speech that is false or misleading.  There are, of 
course, First Amendment issues that arise in the trademark context 
as well, but trademark law, at least, provides a body of law based on 
coherent principles, and it accommodates the tension between 
commercial and speech interests in a more direct fashion. 
E.  Theoretical Elusiveness 
I have argued that the right of publicity was born out of 
expediency, and has evolved in an explosive if not haphazard 
manner, leaving it to the courts and commentators to provide a 
sound justification for the right. 39  The literature is voluminous and 
this varied grab-bag of normative theories justifying an all-inclusive 
right for the misappropriation of personas is uniformly 
unpersuasive.  On review of the literature, I am more convinced 
than ever that whatever interests the publicity right serves, it is 
difficult to see how those interests cannot be supplied by the 
application of trademark law, unfair competition law, and the 
growing law of false endorsement under section 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act.40 
I would like to concentrate on two instrumentalist justifications 
 
37 Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 461 (Cal. 1979). 
38 Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 808. 
39 For two pioneering studies on the right of publicity see Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right 
of Publicity: Maturation of an Independent Right Protecting the Associative Value of 
Personality, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 853 (1995); and Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: 
Commercial Exploitation of the Associative Value of Personality, 39 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1199 
(1986). 
40 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000). 
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for the right of publicity.  In doing so, I am omitting a discussion of 
the natural rights justifications for the right of publicity such as 
Lockean labor theory, unjust enrichment, and various concepts of 
human dignity which have been exhaustively analyzed in the 
literature.41 
The first of these economic approaches could be characterized as 
the “incentive-based theory” and has been acknowledged by the 
courts and some commentators.42  The incentive is based on 
justifications in support of copyright and patent.43  In this 
perspective, a property right of publicity “is needed to encourage 
[the] investment in the development of a public persona,”44 much as 
copyright law promotes investment in original expression or the 
patent monopoly encourages inventive activity.  In short, the 
incentive theory posits that property rights in personas encourage 
individuals to expend more effort in achieving greater success in 
public endeavors such as music, acting, or athletics.45  Of course, it 
is debatable whether the marginal incentive provided by a right to 
publicity really encourages a Tiger Woods to become a great golfer.  
It also is debatable whether those same incentives will have any 
positive effect on already wealthy celebrities to become more 
proficient at what they do.  All this is speculation and not one shred 
of empirical evidence exists proving the incentive effect of publicity 
rights.  At best, the right of publicity adds a small increment of 
protection beyond other claims brought under section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act.46 
Not everyone is persuaded by the incentive effect of publicity 
rights.  The search continues for a more rational basis justifying 
publicity rights from an instrumental standpoint.  In this regard, 
some scholars have opined that publicity rights efficiently allocate 
scarce resources.47  The crux of this distributional efficiency 
 
41 See generally Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Fame, 73 IND. L.J. 1, 35–40 (1997). For a 
spirited critique of natural law justification of the right of publicity, see Michael Madow, 
Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 
127, 178–79 (1993). 
42 See, e.g., Kwall, supra note 41, at 35. 
43 Id. 
44 Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn From 
Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1186 (2006). 
45 Id. at 1186–87 (citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 
(1977) (“[The right of publicity] provides an economic incentive for him to make the 
investment required to produce a performance of interest to the public.”)). 
46 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000). 
47 See, e.g., Jonathan Kahn, Bringing Dignity Back to Light: Publicity Rights and the 
Eclipse of the Tort of Appropriation of Identity, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 213, 245–46 
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justification is that overexposure dissipates wealth embodied in the 
creation of identity.  In other words, unless we provide exclusive 
rights over celebrity personas, its value will become exhausted 
through overexploitation.  A variation on the “tragedy of the 
commons” justification for private property, this “face wear-out” 
argument asserts that a persona is a scarce resource, one that 
would be destroyed by overuse absent property protection.  As 
Landes and Posner have stated: the rationale for providing strong 
publicity rights “is not to encourage greater investment in becoming 
a celebrity (the incremental encouragement would doubtless be 
minimal), but to prevent the premature exhaustion of the 
commercial value of the celebrity’s name or likeness.”48  But is this 
true?  It is arguable whether consumers lose their interest in a 
certain persona because of overexposure.  But one finds too many 
counter examples.  In many instances, overexploitation leads to 
even more fame and an increased value for the cultural icon 
whether a person or object like the Eiffel Tower.49 
Even assuming that face wear-out can take place, this 
distributional efficiency argument fails to consider the “non-
rivalrous” nature of information as a public good which cannot be 
depleted by overuse.  Unlike land or personal property, celebrity 
images cannot be used up.  Of course, the right of publicity reduces 
the use of celebrity images and raises their price, but it is unclear 
how consumer welfare is enhanced by suppressing the competition 
in the use of these images.  It all comes down to how one thinks of 
the incentive effect encouraged by the right of publicity, which I 
believe is a dubious proposition.  As Dogan and Lemley state: “We 
might have to accept such a market distortion if we thought that the 
control we granted over price would encourage new creation, as we 
believe in patent and copyright law, but there is no such 
justification for the right of publicity.”50 
 
(1999). 
48 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 223 (2003) (citations omitted). 
49 See generally Justin Hughes, “Recoding” Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience 
Interests, 77 TEX. L. REV. 923, 960–61 (1999). 
50 See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 44, at 1186. 
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III.  THE PROTECTION OF PUBLICITY RIGHTS IN THE U.K. 
A.  Privacy and Publicity Rights 
The protection of celebrity personas, under privacy or publicity 
rights, has hardly achieved the status of an international norm.  
Rights of publicity in European countries run the gamut, and no 
directive harmonizing such rights has been promulgated.  For 
example, French law confers robust identity rights while Germany 
is less protective.51  Nor is there any worldwide standard of publicity 
rights protection.  In the European Community, no country has 
taken a more minimalist approach to the protection of both privacy 
and publicity than the U.K., providing a stark contrast with the 
United States. 
The comparison between the U.K. and United States is dramatic.  
As compared with the United States, British law has taken a 
radically different path in protecting rights of identity and publicity.  
As for privacy rights, the U.K. has no statutory or common law tort 
of invasion of privacy analogous to that of the United States  In fact, 
U.K. privacy rights had not been recognized in any manner until the 
incorporation into British law of the European Convention of 
Human Rights Act in 1998.52  Engrafting the Human Rights 
Convention proved to be controversial and it took several years for 
British law to acknowledge its obligation under the Convention.53  
Recognition of the Convention, however, may well be a pivotal 
moment in the development of privacy and publicity rights in the 
U.K. 
As for publicity rights, British law recognizes nothing resembling 
the right as it has been known in the United States for more than 
fifty years.  Although publicity rights have been given no statutory 
or common law recognition, British law has protected aspects of 
one’s identity and its commercial value in piecemeal fashion 
through traditional trademark law and passing off. 54 
 
51 For an overview see Eric H. Reiter, Personality and Patrimony: Comparative 
Perspectives on the Right to One’s Image, 76 TUL. L. REV. 673, 681–94 (2002). 
52 See Lorna Brazell, Confidence, Privacy and Human Rights: English Law in the Twenty-
First Century, E.I.P.R. 2005, 27(11), 405, 405–07. 
53 Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2004] 2 A.C. 457, 465–66 (H.L.). 
54 See, e.g., Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd. v. Borden Inc., [1990] 1 W.L.R. 491, 510 (H.L.) 
(defining a passing off action as an action to recover goodwill damaged by the 
misrepresentation of “passing off one person’s goods as the goods of another”). 
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B.  Bringing British Law into the Merchandizing Age: The Eddie 
Irvine Case 
Trademark law and the law of passing off has been the preferred 
method of protecting identity interests in the U.K.  The usefulness 
of the passing off concept was for many years limited by the British 
courts, which required that the plaintiff and defendant be engaged 
in a common field of activity.55  By comparison, the U.S. law of 
passing off is much more accommodating to merchandizing rights 
where the likelihood of confusion may be based on confusion of 
sponsorship, affiliation, or connection.  The breakthrough case 
under British law occurred in 2002 in Irvine v. Talksport Ltd.56 
Eddie Irvine, a well-known Formula One racing driver, sued 
Talksport Radio for the use of his image in the radio station’s 
advertising brochure without obtaining his consent.57  Talksport 
had sent promotional materials to persons and companies within 
the advertising industry.58  The brochure contained an image of 
Irvine holding a radio bearing the Talksport name.59  Talksport had 
taken a previous photo of Irvine holding a mobile phone and 
“doctored” the picture by superimposing the Talksport radio image 
in place of the phone.60  Irvine argued that this amounted to false 
endorsement, a form of passing off.61 
The court took “judicial notice of the fact that it is common for 
famous people to exploit their names and images by way of 
endorsement.”62  Judge Hugh Laddie held that there is nothing 
which prevents an action for passing off succeeding in a false 
endorsement case if the claimant proves two interrelated facts:63 
First, that at the time of the acts complained of he had a 
significant reputation or goodwill.  Second, that the actions 
of the defendant gave rise to a false message which would be 
understood by a not insignificant section of his market that 
his goods have been endorsed, recommended or are approved 
 
55 See, e.g., Tavener Rutledge Ltd. v. Trexapalm Ltd., [1975] F.S.R. 479, 484 (Ch. D.) 
(requiring an “overlap in the fields of activity” of the plaintiff and defendant to secure a 
favorable judgment in a passing off action). 
56 [2002] 1 W.L.R. 2355 (Ch.D.). 
57 Id. at 2358–59. 
58 Id. at 2358. 
59 Id. at 2359. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 2368. 
63 Id. at 2369. 
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of by the claimant.64 
The court did not say that Irvine had a right to control the 
commercial use of his name or image.  Mere “misappropriation” 
remains not actionable in the U.K.  But the court thought that 
Irvine’s case went beyond that.  He had substantial goodwill in his 
name and image that he could protect against a false innuendo of 
endorsement.  The radio station’s promotion had falsely traded on 
his celebrity by suggesting he had endorsed their new product, and 
it had to pay for that lie.  The case was upheld on appeal, resulting 
in a healthy damage recovery for Irvine.65  The recovery was based 
on quantifying what would constitute a reasonable endorsement fee, 
defined as the fee which on a balance of probabilities Talksport 
would have had to pay in order to obtain “lawfully that which it did 
unlawfully.”66 
C.  Privacy Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights 
Privacy rights have finally crept there way into British law 
though the European Rights Convention.  Some have questioned 
whether this is a backdoor way to the adoption of publicity rights 
similar to those found under the U.S. model.  Privacy rights in a 
person’s likeness have received increasing recognition both 
nationally and at the European level.  The key legal justification for 
this change is Article 8(1) of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (“ECHR”), which provides a right to respect for a person’s 
private and family life.67  The U.K. courts, which have long refused 
to recognize any common law right to privacy, have looked to this 
provision to extend to celebrities the power to control when and how 
the media may publish their image and report on their private 
lives.68 
These decisions do not suggest that the ECHR requires publicity 
rights to be recognized in member states.  The ECHR has. However, 
been potent in expanding the notion of privacy for both ordinary 
people and also celebrities in a way that may go beyond U.S. notions 
of privacy.  It now provides a basis by which courts may eventually 
 
64 Id. at 2369–70. 
65 Irvine v. Talksport Ltd., [2003] 35 F.S.R. 619, 646 (Ch. App.). 
66 Id. 
67 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom, art. 8, Nov. 
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 232, available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/ 
005.htm. 
68 See, e.g., Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2004] 2 A.C. 457, 459–60 (H.L.). 
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extend standard principles of civil liability to encompass publicity 
rights.  Those who use personalities in media advertising typically 
obtain consent from the people or estates involved.  We may wonder 
how long it will take for law to gravitate toward recognition of 
publicity rights similar to the U.S. model.  In sum, there have been 
major developments on the privacy front in the U.K.  Equitable 
action for breach of confidence developed into action for misuse of 
private information, including semi-public photographs under the 
influence of the Human Rights Act of 1998 and the European 
Convention on Human Rights.69 
Actions for breach of confidence have been extended to protect a 
celebrity’s commercial interest in private information, including 
photographs of a private occasion, by treating it as analogous to a 
trade secret.70  Michael Douglas and Catherine Zeta-Jones married 
amidst strident security precautions.71  Douglas and Zeta-Jones 
granted OK! Magazine exclusive right to publish photographs of 
their wedding taken by their photographer and approved by them 
for £1 million after Hello! bid unsuccessfully for the same right.72  
Their wedding was infiltrated by a paparazzo photographer who 
surreptitiously took unauthorized photographs, six of which were 
published by Hello!73  In their action against the magazine, a 
judgment was sustained for Douglas and Zeta-Jones.74  The court 
held that the publication of photographs was a misuse of private 
information, justifying damages for distress, and was a misuse of 
commercially confidential information, justifying damages for injury 
to their commercial interests.75  The judgment in favour of OK! was 
reversed.76  Under the contract OK! had no right other than an 
exclusive license to publish the approved photographs.77 
English courts have found a breach of confidence where the 
published information is deemed confidential—either based on the 
reasonable expectations of the person whose right was violated, or if 
the disclosing party had knowledge of the confidentiality of the 
information.  Under the breach of confidence rationale, the House of 
 
69 Id. 
70 Douglas v. Hello! Ltd., [2005] 3 W.L.R. 881, 914 (Ch. App.). 
71 Id. at 891. 
72 Id. at 890. 
73 Id. at 891–92. 
74 Id. at 915–16. 
75 Id. at 913, 915–16. 
76 Id. at 918. 
77 Id. 
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Lords confirmed that a well-known model could get damages 
against the newspaper which published photographs of her leaving 
a drug rehabilitation center.78  These photos were taken with a 
telephoto lens of model Naomi Campbell outside a drug 
rehabilitation center and the court found that the publisher knew or 
should have known that Campbell had a reasonable expectation 
that the information regarding her drug addiction and treatment 
would remain private even though she was on a public street.79 
These developments parallel those at the European level, where 
the European Court of Human Rights in 2004 found that Germany 
had failed to vindicate the privacy rights of Princess Caroline of 
Monaco against newspapers that had printed paparazzi shots of her 
enjoying quiet moments with friends and going about her daily 
business in public by herself or with her children.80  This material 
did not contribute to public debate on any matter of public interest 
and so was not justified under the media’s right to freedom of 
expression.81 
It has taken the English courts a long time to recognize the right 
of personality, but if they remain on the path recently paved in 
Campbell and Douglas, they are well on their way towards creating 
rights similar to those currently protected in Germany and France. 
German82 and French83 laws distinguish the private and the public 
spheres of the lives of celebrities.  They protect their right to keep 
personal activities private, and provide remedies for the 
misappropriation of their name, image, and likeness for commercial 
gain. 
IV.  THE ACTION FOR FALSE ENDORSEMENT AS AN INTERNATIONAL 
NORM 
Celebrity images transcend national boundaries.  Famous golfers, 
basketball stars, and soccer players have international recognition.  
A coalescence toward an international norm that would protect the 
goodwill that celebrities have developed as to their fame would be a 
wholesome development for transnational commerce.  The 
advantages of an international norm for the protection of 
 
78 See Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2004] 2 A.C. 457, 490–93 (H.L.). 
79 Id. at 499. 
80 See Von Hannover v. Germany, [2005] 40 E.H.R.R. 1, 5–6, 29. 
81 Id. at 26–27. 
82 See MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 6:152. 
83 See Reiter, supra note 51, at 681–86. 
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personality right based on false endorsement would be substantial.  
Protection would be anchored in commercial uses of a celebrity 
persona that mislead the public into believing that the celebrity 
endorsed a commercial product.  An action for false endorsement 
serves the dual purpose of protecting the consumer against 
deception in the marketplace while safeguarding the goodwill and 
commercial value that celebrities have developed in their identities.  
It enjoys a firm theoretical basis.  An action in false endorsement 
based on principles of unfair competition circumvents the practical 
problems emanating from the formal “propertization” of publicity 
rights and avoids the more cumbersome issues in applying free 
speech principles.  The British court in the Irvine case got it right 
and its reasoning should be the current standard. 
A section 43(a) suit for false endorsement is based on the 
unauthorized use a celebrity’s identity,84 which is likely to confuse 
consumers as to the plaintiff’s sponsorship or approval of the 
product.  False endorsement is a particularly effective cause of 
action for the use of a celebrity’s image.  The reason is that a 
celebrity’s image, no matter how famous it may be, does not 
necessarily function as a trademark in the classic sense of that 
term.  Although images of a person can function as a trademark 
(and can also be registered), not every image of a person functions 
as trademark.  The trademark owner must prove that the mark 
distinguishes its goods from others to qualify as a trademark.  In 
general, a person’s image or likeness, per se, will not function as a 
trademark unless it is recognized as an indicator of origin.  As one 
court observed, “[u]nder some circumstances, a photograph of a 
person may be a valid trademark—if, for example, a particular 
photograph was consistently used on specific goods.”85  Thus, Tiger 
Woods could not assert trademark rights over the use of his image 
in an artistic rendering of his image.86  On the other hand, the court 
implied that trademark rights could be asserted if one particular 
image of Woods had been consistently used in the advertising and 
sale of goods or services for the purpose of identifying those goods 
and services.87 
 
84 15 U.S.C § 1125(a) (2000). 
85 Pirone v. Macmillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 582–83 (2d Cir. 1990) (rejecting plaintiff claim 
for the use of Babe Ruth’s likeness in three photographs) (emphasis added). 
86 See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g., Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 922 (6th Cir. 2003); cf. Estate of 
Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1363–64 (D.N.J. 1981). 
87 ETW, 332 F.3d at 922 n.5. 
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The gist of a false endorsement claim is somewhat different than 
that under traditional trademark law.  It operates as a mild 
expansion of traditional trademark law to accommodate the current 
marketing environment for celebrity images.  It is based on the 
implication that the plaintiff somehow endorses a product or service 
even though the plaintiff has never engaged in that activity.88  
Thus, a plaintiff need not plead or prove competitive injury to 
succeed on such a claim.  Also, standing to bring an action for false 
endorsement does not require actual competition in the traditional 
sense; it extends to a purported endorser who has an economic 
interest akin to that of a trademark holder in controlling the 
commercial exploitation of his or her identity.  In short, a false 
endorsement cause of action recognizes the interest of a celebrity to 
prevent the wrongful use of his or her identity to promote a product 
with which he or she has no association. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
I have maintained throughout that protection of celebrity identity 
should be based on a misrepresentation trademark model and an 
action for unfair competition rather than a misappropriation 
publicity model.  The U.K. is at a crossroads in the protection of 
identity rights, but the trajectory of the case law is clearly tending 
toward greater rights.  Time will tell whether the recent 
developments in privacy law in the U.K. will mutate into a de facto 
right of publicity. Unfortunately, the U.K. and other European 
countries, by enlarging the notion of privacy rights governed by the 
ECHR, may create a regime similar to the U.S. right of publicity.  In 
the U.K., a trend toward recognition of publicity rights is already 
occurring through expansive notions of privacy based on a theory of 
breach of confidence.  In my opinion, this would be a regrettable 
development and those adopting such a regime would suffer the 
same perverse consequences engendered by publicity rights in U.S. 
law. 
With the Eddie Irvine case, British law has adopted the action for 
false endorsement derived from principles of passing off.  The action 
for false endorsement could be the basis for an international norm 
for the protection of the identity interests of celebrities—a norm 
that would avoid the excesses and problems of a full property 
 
88 Id. at 925–26. 
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regime. 
